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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
- v s -
CRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL, 
Defendant & Appellant. Case No. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of Utah against Craig 
Derrickson Marvell, Defendant and Appellant herein, charging him with the crime 
of murder in the first degree in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 202 (1) 
(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, on 
the 8th day of August, 1975, after a jury t r ia l , the Defendant was found guilty of 
the offense as charged. The Defendant, a n death-qualified" jury having been em-
panelled, elected that further proceedings on the issue of penalty be conducted 
before the Court, and following such hearing before the Court, on the 12th day of 
August, 1975, the Court sentenced the Defendant to death by shooting. 
m 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That this cause be remanded to the trial court for a new trial , or, in 
the alternative, that the death sentence imposed by the trial court be set aside, 
and this case remanded to the trial court for the imposition of a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant was charged with first degree murder, and tried jointly 
with Gypsy Allen Codianna and Irvin Paul Duns don, who were also charged with 
the same offense. 
A chain of circumstantial evidence was presented by the State which failed 
specifically identify the appellant as the murderor of the deceased. An exhaustive 
review of the repor te r ' s transcript of the trial, convinces one of the fact that therj 
is not one scintilla of evidence that the Appellant himself had any motive to kill, 
or that he killed, the deceased. The conviction of the Appellant by the jury neces 
sarily had to be based solely upon ,fguilt by association.Tf 
At the pre-sentence hearing, held before the Honorable Edward Sheya, 
sitting without a jury, the Defendant Irvin Paul Dunsdon testified in his own be-
half that until the very night of the murder, he did not know and had never met 
the Appellant, Craig Derrickson Marvell (Rep. Tr . p . 581 & 597), but met him at 
the "keg-party11 where beer, drugs and marijuana were consumed and used. That 
the Appellant (strange to say), for no known reason engaged him in a conversation 
relating to the victim Hogan, but expressed no intention regarding the man. 
i 
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(Rep. T r . p. 593). That he, Dunsdon, intended to punch and lump up Hogan a 
bit (Rep. T r . p . 591 & 593), because Hogan's testimony had put one of his biker 
friends in jail (Rep. T r . p . 592); and he admitted that he had hit Hogan in the back 
of the head with a pair of b rass knuckles (Rep. T r . p. 591), but that the Appel-
lant Craig Marvell, for no apparent reason, and lacking all evidence of motive, 
wielded the gun and shot the man. 
Dunsdon emphatically denied that,while he was the only party to the crime 
who had a motive to injure the deceased, that he was endeavoring to hang the onus 
of the crime on the Appellant Marvell, and thereby salvage some advantage for 
himself, even though he clearly motivated the course of events that resulted in 
the death of the deceased. (Rep. T r . pgs. 578-600). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS, AND 
IN DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEAT A NEW PANEL. 
The Court 's voir dire implied the defendant's guilt of first degree murder 
when the Court said, " le t ' s make it apply to this case, and say these defendants 
(are) guilty of first degree murder * * * ." (Rep. T r . p . 15). Thereafter, the 
Court placed all of its emphasis on the need to empanel a "death-qualified" jury. 
When the prospective juror Lydia Palacios stated that she didn't think she could 
under any circumstances vote for capital punishment, the Court badgered her 
until she finally agreed that she couldn't do it, and she was then excused. (Rep. 
[3] 
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T r . p . 18). The same applied to the juror Mrs . Alda Alger who stated that she 
didn't believe that she could vote to impose the death penalty, and was excused. 
(Rep. Tr . p. 20-21). On the contrary, when the juror Powell stated, "If he was 
guilty, I could vote for;" meaning the death penalty (Rep. T r . p . 20); and when 
the juror Mr. Christensen stated, "If they are found guilty by the evidence I be-
lieve in capital punishment;" (Rep. T r . p . 22) the Court failed to as pointedly in-
quire of these ju rors , or any of the other jurors , who evidenced no objection to 
the death penalty, whether they had an unwavering death penalty bias. As a r e -
sult, the jury empaneled was a so-called "death qualified" jury; was unbalanced 
and biased; and counsel was left with no means of determining whether the Court 
itself was unequivocally death orientated in capital cases , and counsel was com-
pelled to waive a hearing before the "death-qualified" jury on the issue of penalty, 
and request that the hearing be conducted before the Court, pursuant to Section 
76-3-207, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510; 
Utah Law Review, Vol. 1969 No. 1, p. 154. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT CRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL WAS NOT PERSONALLY 
PRESENT AT ALL STAGES OF THE TRIAL. 
The Court went into session in chambers (Rep. T r . pgs. 37-51) when 
neither the Defendant Craig Marvell nor his attorney were present, and without 
their consent, and undertook to hear arguments on a motion for severance as to 
the co-defendant Irvin Paul Duns don, and which motion directly involved the 
question of the guilt of the Appellant Craig Marvell on the mer i t s , it having been 
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represented to the Court by counsel for the State, without supporting evidence, 
that the Defendant Dunsdon was a participant in a l e s se r degree than the Defend-
ant Craig Marvell. (Rep. T r . p . 42; 48); and neither the Defendant Craig Mar-
veil, nor his attorney, had waived the right to be present at that secre t session 
of the Court in chambers; all of which was in violation of the constitutional right 
of the Defendant Craig Marvell to appear and defend in person or counsel. Ar-
ticle 1, Sec. 12, Constitition of Utah; and in violation of Section 77-1-8(1), and 
Section 77-27-3, U. C. A. 1953 which provides: "If the prosecution is for a felony, 
the defendant must be personally present at the t r ia l * * * ." Neither the De-
fendant Craig Marvell, nor his attorney, were aware that the Court went into 
session in chambers without their presence until the receipt of the reporter 's/ 
t ranscript , and a reading of the proceedings had at such hearing and held without 
notice to them, or either of them, and to which unlawful proceedings they had no 
opportunity to object. State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P . (2d) 1052. 
POINT III 
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BY THE COURT WAS IN VIOLATION 
OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES, IT BEING CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
In the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L .Ed . 2d 346, 92S.CH. 
2726, (hereinafter referred to as the Furman case), replete with historical ref-
erences; pertinent citations of authority; applicable texts; commentaries; and 
relevant statistical data, specific referencesto which, for the purpose of brevity, 
a re not herein repeated, several members of the Court indicated that the impo-
[51 
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sition and carrying out of the death penalty, per se , constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, and is unconstitutional. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, in an exhaustive concurring opinion in the Furmar. 
case, stated that death is an unusually severe punishment, "unusual in its pain, 
in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable 
to death in te rms of physical and mental suffering." 
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in the Fur man case speaks of the penalt 
of death as being unique in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in oui 
concept of humanity. 
In his dissenting opinion, based on the concept that the matter of desig-
nating penalties for profitable conduct should be left to the discretion of the leg-
islative branch of government, ra ther than the judiciary, Mr. Justice Blackmun 
nevertheless said: I!I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, 
indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspecigof physical distress 
and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is but-
t ressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be 
demonstrated. * * * It is antagonistic to any sense of ' reverence for l i fe . | f ! 
And so we find in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, as well as in the dissents, that there is relative unanimity in the fact, 
standing alone, without further consideration, that the death penalty is cruel and 
inhuman punishment; and the Appellant, Craig Marvell, so contends in the instant 
[6] 
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case before this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED SHOULD BE REVERSED, 
AND THE CAUSE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE SENTENCE OF 
THE APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, PURSUANT TO SEC. 76-3-207(4) 
U.C.A. 1953. 
In the Furman case, Mr. Justice Douglas observed that juries or judges, 
as the case may be, have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused 
live or die, and he said: n * * * we deal with a system of law and justice that 
leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether 
defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these 
laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, de-
pendent on the whim of one man or of 12." And Mr. Justice Stewart, in the 
Furman case commented that legislative policy is defined not by what is legis-
latively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion 
conferred upon them. 
The Utah legislature, apparently yielding to the collective wish for ven-
gence and violent solution to the problem of cr ime, has sought to circumvent the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Furman case, and has 
adopted a two-stage t r i a l system; Section 76-3-207(2), which in effect again leaves 
it to the untrammeled discretion of judge or jury whether an accused lives or dies; 
leaves it to the discretion of jury or judge to decide whether the defendant's h i s -
tory of prior criminal activity is significant; whether or not the defendant was, in 
171 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the opinion of the judge or jury, acting under the influence of extreme mental 02 
emotional disturbance; whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or 
under the substantial domination of another person; whether or not the capacity 
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially im 
paired as a result of mental di sease , intoxication or the influence of drugs; 
whether defendant's youth should be considered; whether, if the defendant was an 
accomplice, was his participation relatively minor; and whether any other non-
defined facts, in the discretion of the jury or judge, should be considered in 
mitigation of the penalty. All of these circumstances are relative, and a re left 
to the uncontrolled discretion of jury or judge - - and, under the ruling in the 
Furman case, the statute, Sec. 76-3-207(2) is unconstitutional. 
In the instant case, virtually disregarding the standards attempted to be 
set forth by the legislature, the Court in its discretion undertook to sentence 
Craig Marvell to death. In this case, as heretofore noted, a "Death-Qualifiedn 
jury was empaneled, and the determination of the penalty was therefore left to 
the judicial discretion of the Court, with no means of determing the preconceived 
opinion or conviction of the Court as related to the imposition of the death pen-
alty. What happened was that the Court "passed the buck" back to the legislature 
and stated: " * * * the legislature has reimposed it (the death penalty) here in 
Utah, and in a proper case the Court is band to follow the law as set down in the 
books by the legis la ture ." (Rep. T r . p . 650). And, supposedly, in support of the 
legislature, the Court imposed the death penalty. The Court 's responsibility, 
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whatever its personal conviction as related to capital punishment might be, was 
to courageously support the Constitution of the United States, and to follow the 
law as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Furman case. 
Instead, the Court undertook to sentence Craig Marvell, a marr ied man with four 
children (Rep. T r . p . 515); a man who was never convicted of a felony in any 
Court in this country (Rep. T r . p . 519); a man who was the victim of drugs 
(Rep. T r . pgs. 495-98-99; 510; 516-18; 522; 524-525; 528); to sentence Craig 
Marvell to death apparently on the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant Duns-
don, and bolstered by the representations made by counsel for the State in the s e s -
sion of court held outside the presence of Craig Marvell and his counsel (Rep. T r . 
pgs. 42 & 48) - - Dunsdon, the only defendant who admittedly had a motive and 
sought to injure the deceased (Rep. T r . p . 596); the defendant who was found sat-
urated with the victim's blood (Rep. T r . pgs. 79 & 81); the one defendant who en-
deavored to exonerate himself at the expense of Craig Marvell who had no reason 
to beat up the deceased with b rass knucles (Rep. T r . p . 591), let alone murder 
him. 
In sentencing Craig Marvell to death the Court clearly was taking the po-
sition that retribution was demanded; that the death sentence was imposed be-
cause the accused deserved it; and that naked ven^ance was required. The Court 
said that if this was not a case warranting the death penalty, that it would be hard 
to imagine a case that would warrant that penalty. (Rep. T r . p . 650). Mr. Jus-
[9] 
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tice Brennan in the Furman case said that it was difficult to believe that any sta 
to-day wishes to proclaim adhereence to "naked vengeance.1 ' 
The Utah legislature in the enactment of Section 76-3-207(2), well aware 
of its doubtful validity in the light of the Furman decision, and of the high prob-
ability of its failure to meet the necessary requirements posed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, concluded its legislative effort to reimpose the death 
penalty by enacting Section 76-3-207(4), wherein it provided that in the event the 
death penalty in a capital felony should be held unconstitutional, that the court ha^ 
ing jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death, shall sentence such 
person to life imprisonment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Appellant, Craig Derrickson Marvell, respectfully sub-
mits , that on the basis of the foregoing points, that the judgment rendered in the 
t r ial court should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new tr ial ; or, in 
the alternative, that this Court should order that this Appellant's sentence of 
death be set aside and vacated, and the tr ial court directed to impose a sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
^ctfully submitted, 
»VX*3V :xy^ 
Attorneys^br Craig Derrickson ^T^rvell 
Defendant aire*Appellant 
rs^a^SV 
jrrickson M^rv 
nit V> 
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